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Peter Schuck's new book, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a 
Safe Distance, offers an admirably lucid and forthright account of the 
advantages and disadvantages of affirmative action in the United States. 
Schuck argues that "government-sponsored preferences" should be barred 
"except in the relatively narrow remedial situations that the courts now 
permit,"1 but that affirmative action in private institutions should be allowed 
when it is transparent.2 Schuck candidly and carefully canvasses the arguments 
for and against his position, concluding that: 
[Affirmative action, although well intended, is hard to square with liberal ideals in 
general and the diversity ideal (properly understood) in particular. The social 
benefits are too small, too arbitrarily and narrowly targeted, and too widely resented 
to justify the costs that it imposes - its unfairness to other individuals, its propensity 
to corrupt and debase public discourse, its incoherent programmatic categories, and 
its reinforcement of the pernicious and increasingly meaningless use of race as a 
central principle of distributive justice rather than the other distributive principles, 
particularly merit, with which most Americans, white and minorities alike, strongly 
identify.3 
History has not been exactly kind to Schuck's treatment of affirmative 
action in Diversity in America. The book was written at a time when the 
Supreme Court was hostile to most justifications for affirmative action, with the 
striking exception of the holding in Bakke that allowed institutions of higher 
education to use affirmative action to pursue the goal of "diversity."4 As a 
result Schuck naturally focused his analysis "on the diversity rationale for 
affirmative action."5 But the very year in which Diversity in America was 
t David Boies Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1. Peter H. Schuck, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at A Safe Distance 198 
(2003). 
2. Id. at 196-97. Schuck would prohibit private associations from using affirmative action to 
discriminate "against minorities entitled to the highest level of protection under the equal protection 
principle." Id. at 136. 
3. Id at 135. 
4. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). At the time Schuck was writing, the 
Bakke opinion was under siege. See Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 533 
U.S. 929 (2001). 
5. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 135. Schuck explains that this focus is justified because "of my larger 
interest in how law manages diversity, and because diversity is the only broad rationale that the Supreme 
Court has not yet rejected." Id. 
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published, the Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger.6 Although Grutter used the 
vocabulary of "diversity," it actually approved quite distinct justifications for 
affirmative action in higher education. 
Grutter held that state universities could use affirmative action in order (1) 
to train persons to work in "'an increasingly diverse workforce'";7 (2) to 
maintain "'our political and cultural heritage'"8 by making certain that 
"knowledge and opportunity ... be accessible to all individuals regardless of 
race or ethnicity";9 and (3) to "cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the 
eyes of the citizenry" by ensuring that "the path to leadership be visibly open to 
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."10 These three 
justifications for affirmative action reach far beyond the "diversity" rationale of 
Bakke, which was the primary focus of Schuck's attention.11 
The first justification essentially holds that affirmative action can be 
constitutional if it is functionally necessary to achieve legitimate institutional 
objectives. Several years ago, Judge Richard Posner had used an analogous 
form of instrumental reasoning in Wittmer v. Peters11 to uphold affirmative 
action in the hiring of correctional officers for an experimental prison "boot 
camp." Posner held that racially specific hiring was constitutional because "the 
black inmates are believed unlikely to play the correctional game of brutal drill 
sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some blacks in authority in the 
camp."13 
The first justification of Grutter uses this kind of functional reasoning to 
conclude that affirmative action is constitutional if it is "essential" to the 
success of a legitimate "educational mission."14 Grutter holds that a state law 
school can use affirmative action to secure the "real" educational "benefits" of 
endowing students with "the skills needed in today's increasingly global 
marketplace," which "can only be developed through exposure to widely 
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."15 The Court accepts this claim 
of functional necessity on the basis of "the expert studies and reports entered 
into evidence at trial," as well as "numerous studies [that] show that student 
body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares students for an 
6. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). For a discussion of Grutter, see Robert Post, Foreword: Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56-77 (2003). 
7. 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting Brief of the American Educational Research Association, the 
Association of American Colleges and Universities, and the American Association for Higher Education 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7, Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)). 
8. 539 U.S. at 33 1 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 22 1 ( 1 982)). 
9. Id 
10. Id at 332. 
1 1 . For a detailed comparison of Bakke and Grutter, see Post, supra note 6, at 58-70. 
12. 87F.3d916(7thCir. 1996). 
13. Id. at 920. 
14. 539 U.S. at 328. 
15. Id at 330. 
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increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as 
professionals."16 
Diversity in America does not analyze this claim of functional necessity, 
which prior to Grutter had not appeared in the context of affirmative action in 
higher education. Suffice it to say that the claim is both empirical and quite far- 
reaching. In fact it is so very sweeping as to lead to the suspicion that the Court 
has appropriated social scientific evidence to justify distinct normative values. 
The nature of these values are suggested in the second and third justifications 
for affirmative action advanced by Grutter. 
Grutter holds that affirmative action is necessary in order to maintain "our 
political and cultural heritage."17 Six years before Grutter, I had defended 
affirmative action in higher education on the analogous ground that universities 
should promote "the health of public culture," because a well-functioning 
public culture is a prerequisite for the maintenance of democratic legitimacy.18 
I had argued that "[i]f the racial and ethnic rifts that divide us are to be 
transcended by a democratic state that is legitimate to all sides, there must be 
articulate participation in public culture that concomitantly spans the lines of 
these controversies."19 It followed that the educational mission of universities 
ought to be understood "to include the obligation to facilitate this 
participation."20 
When I made this argument, however, I had (with some discouragement) 
conceded that it was "uncertain whether this justification for affirmative action, 
if candidly expressed, would pass constitutional muster."21 It is understandable, 
therefore, that Diversity in America considers my position only long enough 
accurately to characterize it as "really an effort to change the subject" from 
16. Id. at 331 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
17. Grutter states: 
We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for work 
and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to "sustaining our political and cultural 
heritage" with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society. This Court has long 
recognized that "education ... is the very foundation of good citizenship." For this reason, the 
diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education must 
be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity. The United States, as amicus 
curiae, affirms that "[ejnsuring that public institutions are open and available to all segments 
of American society, including people of all races and ethnicities, represents a paramount 
government objective." And, "[n]owhere is the importance of such openness more acute than 
in the context of higher education." Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic 
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to 
be realized. 
Id. at 331-32 (citations omitted). 
1 8. Robert Post, Introduction: After Bakke, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
1, 23 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998). 
19. Mat 24. 
20. Id 
21. Id 
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"diversity."22 That Grutter can now explicitly approve this argument suggests 
how fundamentally the decision has transformed the normative and legal 
landscape of affirmative action. 
The third justification Grutter offers for affirmative action is somewhat 
analogous to what Schuck calls the "Anticaste" and "Leadership Cadre" 
rationales. Diversity in America dismisses these rationales in four short pages.23 
Schuck rejects the "Anticaste" rationale because "the stunning political, 
economic, and social advances by blacks both individually and as a group" 
mean that affirmative action is "no longer warranted . . . especially in light of 
its social costs.24 And he rejects the "Leadership Cadre" rationale because "the 
vast majority of those admitted to select institutions may well have succeeded, 
participated, and been leaders anyway even without the preferences."25 (Schuck 
carefully concedes, however, that "some of them, perhaps because of reduced 
financial aid opportunities at less select institutions, would have succeeded 
less."26) 
These arguments approach the question of affirmative action from a very 
different perspective than that of Grutter, and, as a consequence, they neither 
anticipate nor adequately answer the considerations that Grutter now puts on 
the table. Grutter defends affirmative action neither on the ground of a lack of 
"genuine democratic participation on the basis of equality,"27 which is how 
Schuck defines the "Anticaste" principle, nor on the ground of cultivating a 
diverse group of leaders, which is how Schuck formulates the "Leadership 
Cadre" rationale. Instead, Grutter explains that affirmative action is necessary 
for the maintenance of legitimacy: 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is 
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society 
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions 
that provide this training 
			 Access to legal education (and thus the legal 
profession) must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the 
educational institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed 
in America.28 
It is striking that Grutter speaks of what must be made "visible" in order 
that society can maintain "confidence" in its leadership. Grutter considers it 
essential that elite educational institutions appear to be "open to talented and 
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity." Schuck's claim that African- 
22. SCHUCK, supra note 1 , at 1 69. 
23. Id. at 156-59. 
24. Mat 157. 
25. Id. at 159. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 156. 
28. 539 U.S. at 332-33. 
28 
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Americans can succeed even without admission to elite educational institutions 
does not meet this argument. Whereas Schuck is concerned with the fact of 
minority success, Grutter is instead focused on the question of legitimacy. 
Grutter suggests that it is not enough for America to be integrated; the potential 
for integration must also be seen. What accounts for this difference in 
approach? 
Schuck agrees that without affirmative action, elite educational institutions 
"might rapidly be stripped of much of their African- American presence."29 But 
Schuck does not seem to count this as a loss, so long as minority students can 
nevertheless receive a good education and achieve ultimate success. The 
resegregation of elite educational institutions is for him only a temporary 
condition that marks the current failure of minority students to excel in the 
forms of merit that presently determine admittance to such institutions. 
Grutter, by contrast, reads this potential resegregation from the particular 
perspective of minority groups, who Grutter believes will interpret their 
exclusion from elite educational institutions as evidence of denigration. Grutter 
regards this possibility as a serious threat to American democracy, because the 
legitimacy of national institutions depends upon all citizens accepting "the 
dream of one Nation, indivisible."30 The allegiance of minority groups to that 
dream is already fragile, because of the "appalling inequalities of 
opportunity"31 that Schuck concedes continue to divide the races. Grutter 
suggests that the visible embrace of minorities by elite educational institutions 
is indispensable for the maintenance of that dream among the growing numbers 
of America's minority citizens. 
Grutter in fact insists that "[effective participation by members of all racial 
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential" for "maintaining 
the fabric of society."32 Grutter regards "education as pivotal to sustaining our 
political and cultural heritage," and for this reason Grutter counts it as "a 
paramount government objective" to ensure that institutions of higher 
education be rendered "open and available to all segments of American society, 
including people of all races and ethnicities."33 Grutter 's determination to 
visibly integrate the realm of public culture derives its urgency precisely from 
the ongoing and "appalling inequalities of opportunity" that continue to plague 
the everyday lives of minority citizens. If the dream of one nation indivisible is 
continuously shattered by blatant differences in health, housing, and wealth, it 
is especially urgent to reconstitute and affirm the possibility of national unity in 
29. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 173; see also id. at 182-86. Schuck believes that in the absence of 
affirmative action, minority students will be redistributed to non-flagship campuses. Id. at 183. 
30. 539U.Sat332. 
3 1 . SCHUCK, supra note 1 , at 201. 
32. 539 U.S. at 331-32. 
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.131 on Sun, 9 Mar 2014 19:17:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 23:25, 2005 
the symbolic realm of public culture. 
The considerations that lead Grutter to defend affirmative action become 
salient only if the question of affirmative action is understood from the distinct 
perspective of minority groups. It is striking that Diversity in America does not 
analyze affirmative action from that point of view. This difference in approach 
underlies a second fascinating point of difference between Grutter and Schuck. 
Schuck would allow private institutions to adopt affirmative action programs 
only if they do so in a transparent way: 
Private entities that now use preferences seldom admit this fact to the public, 
preferring obfiiscation and outright deception to candor. One may argue that silence 
is golden here, that opacity about racial preferences minimizes social disputes over 
abstract, irreconcilable principles and sustains desirable social myths. Although this 
argument for opacity has force in some contexts, it is notably weak as applied to 
affirmative action. There, divisions and suspicions already abound and 
dissimulation serves only to magnify and multiply them, as people who assume that 
preferences are even more widespread than they actually are stigmatize even those 
who did not receive them. Concealment of the truth about preferences inflames 
these social conflicts and injustices.34 
Grutter reaches the opposite conclusion. Because it insists that each 
applicant to an institution of higher education receive "truly individualized 
consideration,"35 Grutter effectively requires affirmative actions plans to use 
highly opaque processes of implicit individual comparisons. Indeed, Gratz v. 
Bollinger,36 the companion case to Grutter, actually rejects the undergraduate 
affirmative action plan of the University of Michigan precisely because of its 
transparency.37 The program had explicitly awarded "20 points, or one-fifth of 
the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single 'underrepresented 
minority' applicant solely because of race."38 Gratz invalidates the program 
because of its failure to give sufficiently individualized consideration to each 
applicant. 
We may ask, then, why the Court seems to forbid the very transparency that 
Schuck believes ought to be mandatory. It is noteworthy that Schuck insists on 
transparency because he is afraid that opacity will fuel white resentment.39 
Schuck is concerned to maintain the legitimacy of national institutions in the 
eyes of the "predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized" individuals - as 
34. SCHUCK, supra note 1 , at 1 96 (internal citations omitted). 
35. 539 U.S. at 334. 
36. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
37. For an analysis, see Post, supra note 6, at 69-75. As Justice Souter remarked in dissent, the 
Court in Gratz managed to fashion a holding in which "[ejqual protection [is] an exercise in which the 
winners are the ones who hide the ball." 539 U.S. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
38. 539 U.S. at 270. 
39. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 196-97. Schuck writes that white "demoralization and anger must be 
counted as a very large social cost. It is no less a cost because it is borne by whites, and often less 
privileged whites at that." Id at 179. 
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Scalia once called them40 - who believe themselves harmed by affirmative 
action. The Court, however, does not seem particularly moved by the views of 
working-class whites. Having accepted the conclusion of elite institutions that 
affirmative action is necessary "in today's increasingly global marketplace,"41 
the Court seems primarily concerned with the effect that transparent affirmative 
action programs will have on its minority beneficiaries. 
The Court in Grutter is worried that minorities may come to feel entitled to 
whatever advantages a transparent affirmative action program may award them, 
and the Court is therefore determined to establish constitutional guidelines that 
will prevent affirmative action from fostering any such a shift toward group 
rights. The Court uses the "individualized consideration" requirement to ensure 
that affirmative action will not lead America down the path to a multiculturalist 
and "quota-ridden society, with each identifiable minority assigned 
proportional representation in every desirable walk of life."42 The Court 
demands that social integration be visible so as to send a message of inclusion, 
but it insists on deliberately obscurantist processes of individualized 
consideration so as to prevent inclusion from modulating into a regime of group 
entitlements.43 
It is striking that the Court both justifies the necessity of affirmative action, 
and crafts constitutional restrictions on the nature of affirmative action 
programs, with an eye to how minorities will regard their place in America. 
40. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
41. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; see also Post, supra note 6, at 65-66. Grutter specifically relies on the 
views of the very elite corporations that Scalia regards as supporting affirmative action because in their 
view "the cost of hiring less qualified workers is often substantially less - and infinitely more 
predictable - than the cost of litigating Title VII cases and of seeking to convince federal agencies by 
nonnumerical means that no discrimination exists." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
42. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43 (quoting Nathanson & Bartnik, The Constitutionality of 
Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 CHICAGO B. REC. 282, 293 
(May- June 1977)); see also Post, supra note 6, at 74-75 (elaborating this point). 
43. On the Court's history of approaching Equal Protection doctrine with this emphasis on 
"appearances," see Post, supra note 6, at 75 n.338. 
31 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.131 on Sun, 9 Mar 2014 19:17:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 23:25, 2005 
This concern is largely absent from Diversity in America. Neither the potential 
threat to the legitimacy of the American State caused by ongoing minority 
disadvantage and disaffection, nor the potential threat to American values of 
individualism44 caused by transparent systems of affirmative action, figure 
prominently in the reasoning by which Schuck reaches his conclusions. He 
builds his case instead by focusing on the need "to discipline the granting of 
preferences"45 in order to minimize the "divisions and suspicions"46 that would 
as a practical matter mostly arise from nonminorities inflamed by opaque 
programs of affirmative action. 
There is much to be gained from Schuck's point of view, but there is also 
much to be gained from the concerns articulated by Grutter. It will be 
fascinating to learn whether Schuck's thinking has at all been affected by 
Grutter' s passionate reasoning, and if so, in what ways. I very much look 
forward to hearing his views. 
44. Schuck agrees that "American culture remains highly individualistic and liberal in its values 
and premises, even at some sacrifice (where compromise is necessary) to its goal of substantive 
equality." SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 202. 
45. Mat 196. 
46. Id 
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